

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING STAFF

September 10, 1959

TO : EUR - Mr. Kohler
FROM : S/P - Gerard C. Smith
SUBJECT: EUR Paper on Khrushchev Visit

1. I would propose that the basic purpose be defined as impressing upon Khrushchev the urgent reality of the danger of nuclear devastation and the need for placing certain limits on our competition in order to mitigate it, while avoiding a false show of good fellowship which would blur that danger and the differences between our countries. Most of the points in the existing statement of the US objectives could be related to this basic purpose; they seem means rather than the end.

2. The paper somewhat appears to over-emphasize arms control. For example, the major adverse consequence of continued Bloc pressures (para II-B, page 1) would be increased risk of war rather than difficulty regarding arms control. Conversely, the principal requirement for improved US-USSR relations (para II-C, page 1) seems to me relaxation of Bloc pressure policies, rather than arms control which might be a result.

3. Is it not overstating the case (para II-A, page 1) to say that "adequate inspection and control, including all bases and countries, is the minimum price" for arms control? There are some initial measures which might require very limited inspection. The point for the President to make on arms control seems to me essentially that put forward in the Department's position paper on this subject for the Khrushchev talks: That the USSR should prepare for renewed arms control discussions by putting its best military and scientific talent to work on the substantive problem, instead of by readying propaganda gimmicks.

4. It may be rather unrealistic to insist that the USSR allow us to compete with it in Bloc countries (para II-C, page 1). Might it not be more effective and convincing to concentrate on underlining the basic point in para II-B: that the USSR must stop its pressures on peripheral free world areas if the danger of war is to be controlled?

5. I would favor using the initial meeting with Khrushchev (para IV-A, pages 2-3) to emphasize sternly the President's

hope that

hope that Khrushchev will use this trip for serious discussion of means of reducing the danger of nuclear devastation, rather than to stage a propaganda circus. I'd hit hard the danger posed by Bloc pressures on Berlin and Laos. In short, I'd subject Khrushchev to the kind of two stage treatment sometimes meted out by the USSR to state visitors. The object of the first stage, which would occur in the September 15 President-Khrushchev meeting, would be to try to startle Khrushchev into re-thinking his approach to this trip, so that he would be prepared for serious discussion - rather than propaganda and false bonhomie - upon his return.

6. In the second phase (para B, page 3), I'd concentrate on:

(a) the dangers posed by Bloc pressure policies - Laos and Berlin;

(b) our determination to resist these pressures, despite the risk of war;

(c) our earnest desire to reduce this risk - e.g., by implicit agreement to place certain actions out of bounds, by explicit agreements in other fields such as arms control, by working with the USSR to dampen war crises as in Laos, and by continuing and extending "communication" between our two governments.

7. The above substantive comments apply to the specific subject papers also. I have the following additional comments on them:

(a) Over-all Relations: I thought the first full para. on page 3 -- the treatment of possible increased US defense expenditures -- excellent.

(b) Berlin and Germany: I'd probe Khrushchev for new proposals on Berlin -- pointing out why we have found his Free City and interim arrangement proposals unacceptable, stressing the advantages to both of us of settling this problem on basis that would last until reunification, and asking if he has alternative proposals to this end in line with his remark to the Vice President that there was more than one way this problem could be settled.

(c) Bilateral: Why not have the President state frankly that trade will hinge on non-economic

agreements

agreements (e.g., Berlin and Test suspension) which would improve the atmosphere? This sort of quid pro quo approach might be more convincing and understandable to Khrushchev than a discussion of the merits of our trade position.

(d) Laos: Might not the President hit this issue hard and often from the start, much as Khrushchev jumped the Captive Peoples Resolution, in an effort to bring the dangers of the Laos situation home to Khrushchev?

8. One final comment: Would it be useful to include in the paper a reference to the need for a grave posture by the President, which would make clear that he is deadly earnest in seeking to reduce the danger of war and underline his unwillingness to cooperate with Khrushchev in staging a demonstration of friendship which could only be insincere, given the differences between us.